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Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate Technology Transfer  
 
By Joëlle de Sépibus 
 
Abstract 
 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the largest technology-transfer 
mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The idea of maintaining it or scaling it up in the post-2012 period, to 
accelerate technology transfer, is hence attractive. The weak environmental integrity of 
the CDM and its propensity to promote predominantly end-of-pipe technologies, 
however, caution against its perpetuation under a new global climate accord. This paper 
proposes that, if the CDM were to be maintained, reforms should be adopted to improve 
the investment conditions for key climate technologies and modify the incentive structure 
of the CDM. While such reforms contribute to making key technologies more attractive 
for investors they do not address the CDM’s inability to foster policy reforms. This paper 
therefore suggests that the CDM is progressively phased out in favour of sectoral carbon 
crediting mechanisms. 
  
Introduction  
 
Innovation and technology transfer is critical for achieving low carbon and climate 
resilient development.1 This is recognised by both the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol (KP) which request 
Parties to cooperate in the development, diffusion and transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies.2 It was however only with the Bali Action Plan (BAP)3 that the issue 
moved center stage. Developing countries had made it clear that without “enhanced 
action on technology development and transfer” no ambitious global climate deal could 
                                                 
1 A study led by Dechezleprêtre drawing on patent data for thirteen climate technologies shows that 
innovation in climate change technologies is highly concentrated in Japan, Germany and the USA. 
International transfers mostly occur between developed countries (75%), whereas exports from developed 
countries to emerging economies are still limited (18%). According to the authors this suggests a huge 
potential for the development of North–South transfers. See Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009: 4); see also 
Tomlinson et al. (2009). 
2 See Articles 4.1, 4.3, 4.5 and 11.1 UNFCCC.  
3 The BAP was adopted by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC to launch the negotiation 
process for a new international climate agreement for the period after 2012 to be concluded at the UN 
conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. See FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1; Bazilian et al. (2008: 5). 
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be struck for the period after 2012. Developed countries hence agreed to support 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) of developing countries by 
“technology, financing and capacity-building” in a “measurable, reportable and verifiable 
manner”.4 As a result, the transfer of both financial resources and technology has become 
a central “supporting pillar” for both mitigation and adaptation in the UNFCCC 
negotiation process for a new global climate accord.5 
 
So far, the principal international tools financing technology transfer have been the funds 
administered by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)6 and the Adaptation Fund.7 A 
rather effective instrument for supporting the diffusion of mitigation technologies under 
the Kyoto Protocol has been the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),8 which rewards 
investors from developed countries for investing in projects in developing countries 
resulting in additional reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Although it has no explicit 
technology mandate, the CDM has facilitated technology transfer by financing emission 
reduction projects that use technologies currently not available in host countries.9 
Moreover, the CDM has financed adaptation technologies through a levy of two percent 
on the proceeds of the CDM projects.  
 
Given the important financial flows10 generated by the CDM and its contribution to 
technology transfer, many stakeholders are pressing to keep or even upgrade the CDM in 
the post-2012 climate regime.11 The continued recourse to the CDM in its current form is, 
however, problematic.12 The dubious additionality of many projects, the absence of a 
truly neutral verification process and the deficiencies of its oversight have largely 
contributed to weaken the credibility of the CDM as an offset mechanism. Further, in 
leaving the initiative largely to private actors focusing on short-term abatement measures, 
the CDM has failed to foster policy reform. Worse still, perverse incentives tend to 
protract rather than strengthen the implementation of mitigation policies. 
 
Recognizing both the potential of the CDM to foster technology transfer and its 
environmental shortcomings, this study investigates whether the CDM can be reformed to 
allow it to serve the Bali mandate more forcefully while also securing its environmental 
integrity. The paper begins by introducing the reader to the current discussions on the 
future international framework for technology transfer. In section II it summarises the 
                                                 
4 Bazilian et al. (2008: 19).  
5 Bazilian et al. (2008: 19); European Commission (2009: 9). 
6The GEF is a global partnership among 178 countries, international institutions, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to address global environmental issues. See 
http://www.gefweb.org/ 
7 The Adaptation Fund was established to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in 
developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change.  See also UNFCCC, Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) (2009b:36). 
8 Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol. 
9 See Seres (2008). 
10 The CDM has grown to a global multi-billion dollar market with about 1.5 to 2 billion Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) being issued up to 2012. See Schneider (2008: 24). 
11 Key elements being explored include a broadening of its scope11 and the inclusion of “sectoral” or 
“policy” CDMs. See Sterk (2008).  
12 De Sépibus (2009); Wara (2008), Lohmann (2008), McCully (2008), Schneider (2007, 2008). 
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main concerns expressed with respect to the environmental integrity of the CDM and 
reviews the literature regarding its contribution to technology transfer. Section III 
proposes to enhance the investment conditions of host countries for key technologies and 
to change the current incentive structure of the CDM. Section IV concludes by discussing 
the pros and cons of substitution of the CDM with a sectoral carbon crediting mechanism.        
I. The international framework of technology transfer   
 
The centrality of the technology question comes from the realisation that a reduction of 
emissions consistent with the objective of the European Union, which is to keep global 
warming under 2 °C higher than pre-industrial levels, would entail developed countries 
having to reduce their emissions in the range of 25–40% by 2020 and 80–95% by 2050, 
whereas developing countries would need to limit the rise in their greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) by 15–30% below those of 1990 by 2020.13 To reach such an ambitious 
goal a significant scale-up of public and private research and development (R&D) 
programs as well as enhanced deployment14 and diffusion15 programs, together with 
private-sector investment flows for mitigation technologies are necessary in both 
developed and developing countries.16   
 
As developing countries often lack the capacity to develop and finance critical climate 
technologies, developed countries17 will have to increase the pace and extent of the 
current technology transfer.18 This does not merely mean increasing the supply and 
shipment of hardware but also requires fostering the “processes covering the flows of 
know-how, experience and equipment” and the capacity of developing countries to 
“understand, utilize and replicate the technology” to “adapt it to local conditions and 
integrate it with indigenous technologies”.19 The latter is critical as only the acquisition of 
domestic capacities to master the received knowledge and to innovate from it will allow 
developing countries to sustain a low-carbon path.20  
 
                                                 
13 European Commission (2009: 5). 
14 Deployment means initiatives that seek to accelerate investment in and use of near-commercial 
technologies, resulting in cost reductions and improvements in technology maturity and market acceptance. 
See UNFCCC, EGGT (2009a: 17). 
15 Diffusion refers to efforts to increase the adoption of and investment in existing technologies, with 
existing technologies defined as those technologies that are commercial and cost-effective for application in 
markets around the world. See UNFCCC, EGTT (2009a: 22). 
16 See UNFCCC, EGTT (2009a: 37). 
17 Dechezleprêtre et al. note in their study on patent data that China, Russia and South Korea have become 
major innovators in climate technologies. Technology exchanges between emerging economies, however, 
are almost non-existent. According to this study there is hence also a huge potential for South–South 
exchanges—particularly given that these countries may have developed technologies that are better tailored 
to the needs of developing countries. See Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009: 30).  
18 According to the Chair of the EGTT around US$ 260.670 billion per year of additional investment above 
current levels in mitigation technologies will be required by 2030 to stabilize the climate. See UNFCCC, 
EGTT (2009a: 10).  
19 For a review of the literature on technology transfer see Bazilian (2009: 10ff). 
20 See International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (2008). 
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In response to increasing awareness of the pressing need to boost technology transfer, in 
2001 the COP21 set up a comprehensive technology transfer framework,22 which led to 
the establishment of a web-based portal for technology-related information,23 the conduct 
of capacity building programs and the elaboration of so-called technology needs 
assessments (TNAs24). The COP moreover supported efforts to improve policy and 
market conditions with the aim of accelerating the uptake of technologies by developing 
countries. Finally, it created an Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT)25 whose 
function is to identify ways to facilitate the development and transfer of technology 
activities.26  
 
Notwithstanding these efforts, a study led by Dechezleprêtre drawing on patent data 
shows that the measures have not led to any “visible effect” on technology transfer.27 
Aware of the need to scale up the efforts, the COP decided in Bali to strengthen the 
international framework for technology transfer.28 Parties were requested to explore new 
mechanisms to accelerate the deployment, diffusion and transfer of technologies, to 
reinforce cooperation on research and development and to foster technology cooperation 
in specific sectors as well as to develop tools that would enable the measurement, 
reporting and the verification of the support provided by developed countries for 
mitigation actions in developing countries.  
 
The first concrete steps towards realizing these plans were taken by the COP in 
December 2008, when it adopted the “Poznan strategic programme on technology 
transfer” which foresees scaling up the funding for technology transfer by US$ 50 
million.29 The COP also requested the GEF to expedite technology transfer projects, to 
assist developing countries and to prepare or update their TNAs.30 Stepping up its 
support, the GEF has since then pushed developing countries to go beyond identifying 
technology needs and to develop so-called Technology Action Plans (TAPs) for 
prioritized mitigation and adaptation technologies.  
 
                                                 
21 The Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC. 
22 The technology transfer framework identified five key themes: technology needs and needs assessments, 
technology information, enabling environments, capacity-building, and mechanisms for technology 
transfer.  
23 See the homepage of TT-clear on the internet at http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/index.jsp 
24 In the TNAs, developing countries define their needs with respect to the deployment and the diffusion of 
environmentally sound technologies. 
25 From 2001 to 2007 the EGTT reported to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA). Since Bali, the expert group has also been reporting to the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). See http://unfccc.int/ttclear/jsp/EGTT.jsp 
26 In April 2009, the EGTT published three reports, a strategy paper evaluating the principal options that 
would allow enhancement of technology development and transfer in the long run, a paper addressing 
financing options and a study on performance indicators related to the effectiveness of the technology 
transfer framework. See UNFCCC, EGTT (2009a, b, c). 
27 Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009: 3).  
28 Bazilian et al. (2008: 18).  
29 UNFCCC, EGTT (2009a: 21). 
30 Global Environmental Facility (2009).  
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In the current negotiations, consensus seems to be emerging on certain key priorities, but 
has yet to be reached on the specific form and function of a new international technology 
transfer framework.31 Parties seem to concur on the need to build enabling environments 
for technology diffusion through the creation of appropriate policy frameworks; to 
increase international collaboration on key technologies; to create centers of excellence 
that incentivize innovation; and mechanisms for accelerating the diffusion of existing 
technologies.32 With respect to the generation of new financial resources, the main 
variants proposed by Parties are contributions of public finance, funds generated from 
market mechanisms and levies on international transactions.33  
 
The role that the CDM will be attributed within this new framework is not yet clear.34 
Given its potential for mobilizing private entities to combat climate change,35 it might be 
useful to investigate whether it could be reformed so as to channel more financial flows 
towards most needed climate technologies.   
 
II. The Clean Development Mechanism  
 
The CDM, established by the Kyoto Protocol to allow industrialized countries to achieve 
a portion of their required emission reductions in countries without emission targets, was 
designed with the dual aim of helping developing countries to achieve sustainable 
development and of assisting industrialized countries to comply with their GHG 
reduction obligations. Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol set out the basic provisions of the 
CDM, but left out many details of its operation. These were completed by the so-called 
“Marrakesh Accords” which laid down the principal modalities and procedures of the 
CDM36 and numerous decisions37 of the Executive Board (EB), in charge of the 
supervision of the CDM.38  
 
Each CDM project cycle starts with the establishment of a project design document 
(PDD),39 by a project developer. The project developer must demonstrate that his or her 
                                                 
31 The paper identifies institutional structures and their governance, delivery of financial support, and 
technology cooperation and cooperative research and development as key issues reflected in Party 
submissions. See UNFCCC, AWG-LCA (2009)  
32 Staley et al. (2009: 7). 
33 UNFCCC, Ad-hoc Working group (2009: 8). 
34 In the current negotiations the EU has been asking for a phasing-out of the CDM for advanced 
developing countries.  
35See http://uneprisoe.org/  
36 The “Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol” were adopted by the 7th session of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC COP) held in Marrakesh, Morocco, in December 2001 and 
confirmed by the First session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol (hereafter “COP/MOP”) in Montreal in December 2005; FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 
Decision 3/CMP.1. Hereafter, the “CDM rules”. 
37 The decisions of the EB have been numbered sequentially and are available on the Internet at: 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/index.html 
38 CDM rules, par. 5. 
39 The PDD contains details about the proposed CDM project, including a description of the project activity 
that will reduce GHG. See CDM rules, Appendix B. 
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project leads to emission reductions that are ‘additional’ to those that would have 
occurred under a ‘business as usual’ scenario and has to make sure that the project meets 
the conditions set out by the host country. The PDD, together with a “letter of approval” 
from the host country is then submitted by the project developer to an independent entity, 
the Designated Operation Entity (DOE), for validation. The DOE reviews it40 and 
submits it to the EB for registration. The request for registration by the DOE is 
considered granted unless three or more of the EB members request a review.41 
 
If everything goes to plan, the EB issues the credits in the amount of one Certified 
Emission Reduction (CER) for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent42 of emissions 
reduced.43 The CERs resulting from a CDM project can be purchased by private and 
public entities, but are used by an Annex I Party at the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s 
commitment period to demonstrate its compliance with its commitment.  
 
A. The shortcomings of the environmental integrity of the CDM  
 
At the heart of the environmental integrity of the CDM lies the concept of ’additionality’, 
which ensures that credits are not issued for emission reductions that would have 
occurred anyhow.44 So far, the establishment of transparent and objective criteria for 
assessing the additionality of a project has remained problematic.45 The principal concern 
is that they rely on criteria and assumptions that would be hard to verify and are easy to 
manipulate.46 This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the emission reductions 
claimed by project proponents are verified by private entities which are chosen and paid 
by them.47 The resulting conflict of interests creates a significant risk that the verification 
process is not carried out objectively.48  
 
Another delicate issue relates to the decision of the EB that project proponents may 
ignore policies aiming at the reduction of GHGs passed by host countries after 2001 
when calculating the amount of credits generated by their project. This decision was 
taken to avoid the deterrent effect the CDM has on the adoption of such legislation. Many 
developing countries had indeed become reluctant to implement climate-friendly policies 
for fear that this would result in fewer projects being hosted by them.49 The decision of 
the EB, though welcomed to prevent a stalemate regarding the adoption of climate 
legislation, has a serious drawback. By allowing project proponents to proceed this way, 
                                                 
40 CDM rules, par. 26 ff. 
41 CDM rules, par. 41. 
42 This measure is used by cl imate experts to compare the global warming potential (GWP) of GHGs other 
than carbon dioxide (CO2) with the GWP of the latter.   
43 CDM rules, par. 64 ff. 
44 See Schneider (2008: 20). 
45 Schneider (2008: 23). 
46 De Sépibus (2009: 13). 
47 Schneider (2008: 14). 
48 Schneider (2008: 14). 
49 See Willis et al. (2006: 18).  
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the danger that the CDM is generating meaningless credits has been significantly 
enhanced. Calculated on a biased baseline, the number of credits generated by these 
projects is artificially inflated. Moreover, the passage of time will exacerbate the 
problem. As developing countries start to adopt policies for tackling climate change, the 
baseline used to calculate the number of credits will become less and less plausible.  
 
B. The contribution of the CDM to accelerating technology transfer  
 
When the CDM was launched it was expected to lead to large transfers of technologies 
and expertise “flowing from the technologically developed North to the South”.50 On the 
basis of many studies which had demonstrated that foreign direct investment generally 
promoted knowledge transfer, the hope was that the CDM would become a new and 
effective channel for investments in innovative green technologies.  
 
The surveys conducted so far, which have examined the propensity of CDM projects to 
lead to technology transfer, indicate that this expectation has only partly been met.51 
According to an analysis undertaken by Seres for the UNFCCC, about 36% of the CDM 
projects examined, accounting for 59% of the annual emission reductions, refer to some 
form of technology transfer.52 The study demonstrates that agriculture, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), landfill gas, nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and wind projects tended 
to have more frequent recourse to foreign technology, whereas biomass, cement, hydro 
and transport projects did so less often.53 These results confirm the findings of an earlier 
investigation, led by Dechezleprêtre, which identified two main areas of technology 
transfer: end-of-pipe destruction of non-CO2 GHGs with high global warming potentials, 
such as HFCs, methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), and wind power.54  
 
Most of the projects examined by Seres involve the transfer of both equipment and 
knowledge.55 The study also provides evidence that technology transfer is more common 
in projects with foreign participants and in large-scale projects than in unilateral and/or 
small-scale projects.56 In general, the reasons given in this study for the import of foreign 
                                                 
50 Doranova et al. (2009: 5). 
51 See Dechezleprêtre et al. (2009); Doranova et al. (2009); Haites et al. (2008); Seres et al. (2008); 
Youngman et al. (2008). 
52 The sources used by this author are principally the Project Design Documents (PDD). As no definition of 
“technology transfer” is provided to project participants, each project is free to use its own interpretation. 
Most project participants seem to interpret “technology transfer” as meaning the use of equipment or 
knowledge not previously available in the host country for the CDM project. See Seres (2008: 7).  
53 Seres (2008: 10).  
54 Dechezleprêtre et al. (2007: 27). 
55 About 32% of the projects that claim technology transfer involve only imports of equipment. Transfers of 
knowledge alone occur in 15% of the projects. See Seres (2008: 18).  
56 No direct link, however, can be established between the share of technology transfer and the size of a 
country or its per capita GDP. Generally, technology transfer is less apparent in projects hosted by Brazil, 
China, and India. See Seres (2008: 8). 
Comment [s1]: Query on 
footnote 49 (highlighted). Page 
number?
 9
technologies are that they are not available domestically or that they are more efficient 
and/or more reliable than similar domestic ones.57  
 
Other studies show that the probability that the CDM leads to technology transfer is 
higher for countries with an open economy, strong GDP growth58 or which have a good 
investment climate.59 They also suggest that the likelihood that projects will include 
foreign technology is greater in host countries with a subsidiary of an Annex-I country 
firm.60 Finally, it is noted that there is no clear-cut pattern as regards the transfer of 
technology to countries at more advanced stages of development.61.  
 
In conclusion, the surveys demonstrate that the CDM has contributed to accelerate the 
transfer and the diffusion of certain mitigation technologies and countries, but for others 
it has remained ineffective.62 Moreover, if the CDM has proven relatively successful at 
attracting both finance and technical assistance on a project level, it has been incapable of 
encouraging policy changes, let alone the setting up of the institutional and technical 
capacities necessary to foster innovation.63 Finally, being a market instrument that 
concentrates on single projects, the CDM has probably not promoted “much cumulative 
technological learning”, a prerequisite for any long-term uptake of new technologies.64 
 
The emphasis placed on cheap abatement strategies to maximize short-term profits means 
moreover that in most cases, it is not the technology with the greatest potential to reduce 
the long-term carbon footprint of a country that is chosen, but the one which generates 
the cheapest carbon credits. As a result, highly profitable industrial gas65 or landfill 
projects with low ancillary environmental and social benefits, using existing end-of-pipe 
technologies, dominate the CDM pipeline and generate the lion’s share of technology-
transfer-based emissions reductions. 66  
 
Though developing countries may guide the choice of technologies by formulating 
sustainability criteria for the projects they host, their capacity for gearing the CDM 
towards certain types of technologies which would address their needs and priorities is 
                                                 
57 Seres (2008: 18). 
58 Glachant et al. (2008:17). 
59 Pueyo Velasco (2007: 5).  
60 Glachant et al. (2008:17). 
61 In theory, this factor has an ambiguous effect, as high capabilities are necessary to adopt a new 
technology, but also imply that many technologies are already available locally. The survey led by 
Dechezleprêtre shows that for this type of countries the propensity to take recourse to technology transfer is 
high for the energy and chemicals industries, but low for agricultural projects. See Dechezleprêtre et al. 
(2007: 27). 
62 Doranova et al. (2009). 
63 See Bazilian et al. (2008: 37). 
64 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008).  
65 The reduction of so-called “super-pollutants” (CH4, N2O, HFC-23, polyfluorocarbon (PFCs), sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6) is highly beneficial as reductions in emissions of these chemicals lead to far greater 
reductions in global warming than one molecule of CO2. Compared to CO2’s GWP of 1, the GWPs of the 
other super-pollutants are dramatically higher. GWPs: CH4, 21; N2O, 310; HFC-23, 11,700; PFCs, 6,500–
9,200; and SF6, 23,900. Because CERs are awarded on the basis of the GWP of a gas, investors can receive 
thousands more CERs for a one-ton reduction of a super-pollutant than CO2. See Schatz (2008: 719). 
66See UNEP RISOE at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm#1 
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limited. Indeed, as the formulation of technological requirements limits the number of 
projects they may host, developing countries have few incentives to require and/or to 
enforce them. Moreover, as positive ancillary benefits of technologies (i.e. improved 
knowledge and skills, employment opportunities, and improved environmental quality) 
are not financially rewarded, they fail to have a significant influence on investment 
flows.67 The share of projects with high sustainability benefits such as energy efficiency 
programmes has accordingly remained tiny despite the considerable efforts to make their 
registration easier.68 Also, the CDM has so far hardly contributed to finance any large-
scale infrastructure in the low-carbon energy or public transport sector.69  
 
A positive evolution can be noted with respect to the promotion of certain renewable 
energy sources.70 As a result of the adoption of less bureaucratic rules for small-scale 
projects71 their number has substantially increased in recent years. This apparent success 
must however be put into perspective as the “additionality” of many of these projects is 
dubious, the CDM revenue generally enhancing their profitability only marginally.72 
Moreover, mainly hydro and wind projects have been registered but there have been 
hardly any technology with a high mitigation potential, but important upfront costs, such 
as solar, geothermal or tidal energies.73 Finally, as McCully notes in his critique of Asian 
hydro projects, the additionality of these projects is all the more questionable as many of 
the registered projects had already started before the request for registration was 
formulated.74  
 
Finally, a study on the contribution of the CDM to sustainable energy technology 
transfers highlights the fact that project developers often favour technologies “anchoring 
in existing systems and know-how”.75 As a result, in the field of electricity production, 
the CDM has largely contributed to financing large fossil-fuel power stations which lock 
the host country into a high-carbon path.76 The propensity to fund such projects is 
moreover enhanced by the fact that historically these industries have had close ties with 
governments and are able to pay upfront the large transaction and consultancy costs 
incurred by CDM projects.  
 
III.  Reforming the CDM to foster the transfer and diffusion of critical climate 
technologies  
        
                                                 
67 Schneider (2008: 29). 
68See UNEP RISOE at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm#1 
69 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008: 39).  
70 See UNEP RISOE at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm#1 
71 See Leguet et al. (2008: 75). 
72 A project is additional if the project would not have been implemented in the absence of the CDM. 
Schneider demonstrates that if the CDM contributes only marginally to the profitability of a project the 
argument that the project would not have been implemented without the CDM is implausible. This is 
however the case for most projects using renewables. See Schneider (2007: 40).  
73See UNEP RISOE at http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm#1 
74 See McCully (2008: 5).  
75 ENTTRANS (2007: 9) 
76 See de Sépibus (2009).  
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Despite the shortcomings of the CDM stakeholders stress its direct and indirect benefits77 
and push for its maintenance under a future climate agreement. The CDM may thus well 
continue to play a role in the future, if only transitorily and/or for certain countries. While 
recognizing the potential of the CDM to leverage private finance for investments in low-
carbon technologies, we believe that if the CDM is to be maintained, reforms should be 
undertaken to bring it more in line with the BAP and the international framework for 
technology transfer.  
 
With such considerations in mind, this paper builds on the current discussions on the 
potential of the CDM to accelerate technology transfer. It recommends in particular 
giving the CDM a clear mandate for the transfer and diffusion of low carbon 
technologies. To avoid this goal being merely paid lip service, this paper explores also 
how investment conditions for projects promoting key climate technologies can be 
improved. Finally, it offers a list of structural reforms that would allow channeling 
private investment flows towards those technologies that are the most needed to ensure a 
long-term reduction of GHGs. 
 
A. A technology mandate for the CDM  
The Kyoto Protocol has assigned the CDM a double goal: the reduction of GHGs and the 
promotion of sustainable development in developing countries. It remains silent, 
however, on the technology issue. Although this situation has been partly remedied by 
the COP which recognized that CDM must lead to technology transfer78 a new climate 
agreement should explicitly state that the CDM must contribute to the transfer and the 
diffusion of key climate technologies. Only if the CDM has a clear technology mandate 
will it be justifiable for the reforms to place a stronger emphasis on this role.    
 
Moreover, to gain a good understanding as to how the CDM fosters technology transfer 
and diffusion, a consistent database should be established. So far, the PDDs constitute the 
main source of information for the studies exploring this topic.79 The information 
provided by project developers remains however often approximate and sketchy.80 For 
instance, none of the documents examined by Seres indicated the commercial 
arrangements for the technology transfer and, in certain cases, the PDDs did not even 
reveal the origin of the technology.  
 
This lack of information is unfortunate. A reform of the CDM should thus also include a 
requirement that project developers provide more information on the transfer and the 
                                                 
77 Among the benefits most often cited are awareness-raising, capacity building and its potential to help in 
discovering cheap mitigation options. 
78 Recognizing the importance of technology in tackling climate change and the necessity for its transfer to 
developing countries, the Conference of the Parties (COP) decided in 2000 that the CDM must also lead to 
the transfer of “environmentally sound technologies”. See FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.3. 
79 When submitting their projects, developers are requested to state which technology will be employed and 
to provide a description of how the technology and related know-how will be transferred to the host 
country, in their project documents. See Section A.4.3 of the PDD. 
80 Seres et al. (2008: 6) 
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diffusion of technologies.81 For instance, it would be useful to know precisely why 
foreign, local technology or a combination of both was used what kind of equipment or 
knowledge was transferred, whether it has improved the technological capacity of local 
staff or whether it involved the transfer of intellectual property rights. Indeed, only if 
more in-depth information can be gathered through the CDM on the use of low carbon 
technologies can the lessons be drawn and shortcomings in the international framework 
be addressed.82 In practical terms, this means that the information provided by the PDDs 
should be more comprehensive and that monitoring reports should clearly explain which 
technology was used, how it was transferred and whether it has contributed to capacity-
building in the host country. This information should then be regularly compiled and 
updated by the EB and made available to the wider public through a user-friendly 
database accessible on the Internet. 
 
B. The enhancement of investment conditions for CDM projects fostering 
critical climate technologies 
 
To increase technology transfer and diffusion, host countries should improve investment 
conditions for crucial CDM projects and provide them with tailor-made support. To 
determine which CDM projects should be given preferential treatment developing 
countries will have to carry out thorough TNAs,83 which purpose is to identify the key 
technologies needed to reduce the adverse effects of climate change, to find out about the 
market and identify trade barriers that hinder their transfer and to assess the policy, 
institutional and finance options for overcoming these barriers.84 The national focus of 
these assessments is of particular importance as the type and the size of the technologies 
and their barriers vary considerably from country to country.85  
 
When assessing the technology needs of a country, particular attention should be paid to 
avoid anchoring them inadvertently in existing technologies and infrastructures.86 A large 
empirical study on the promotion of sustainable energy services has revealed that 
ingrained habits and insufficient information often prevent the available low carbon 
                                                 
81 See also Schneider et al. who suggest that a requirement should be introduced that obliges project 
developers to provide information on the technological specification and the name of the technology 
supplier as well as on key problems occurring during operation, in the monitoring reports. See Schneider et 
al. (2008: 2937).  
82 Schneider et al. add that the creation of a database relating to the transfer and the diffusion of technology 
would be very valuable for use by policy-makers to continuously assess the CDM’s technology-transfer 
performance and thereby identify capacity-building needs. See Schneider et al. (2008: 2937). 
83 See UNFCCC (2007).  
84 Barriers may take the form of high costs of new technology, lack of technical information, import and 
export restrictions, inadequate government policies, outdated procurement requirements, inappropriate 
technology standards, and lack of experience in accelerating technology uptake. See EGTT (2009a: 25 ff.); 
Staley et al. (2009: 12 ff.) 
85 See Global Environmental Facility (2008).     
86 ENTTRANS (2007: 11).  
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technologies from being fully considered.87 It thus recommends that before agreeing on a 
portfolio of low carbon technologies, developing countries should have improved the 
technology-related knowledge of all stakeholders involved88 and should undertake a 
“market mapping exercise” 89  to identify the appropriate business enabling environment, 
the market chain and the market supporting services of a particular technology. The 
results of the latter may then assist developing countries in designing TAPs which 
determine more concretely how critical technologies should be deployed in the short- and 
medium term.90  
 
Once a portfolio of prioritised technologies has been agreed upon, special support should 
be granted to CDM developer considering their deployment. Many studies show indeed 
that certain technologies will only be realized if measures are taken to minimize the risks 
associated with their implementation.  
 
Following the example of certain Designated National Authorities (DNAs) that carry out 
promotional activities, host countries could set up agencies whose mission would be to 
provide tailor-made support to developers who invest in key technologies.91 These 
agencies, could, for instance, create a database containing  crucial project information, 
sponsor demonstration programmes for new technologies, establish an Internet portal, 
create newsletters, organize seminars and training courses for project developers, assist in 
the creation of market networks, and provide translation services and assistance for the 
design of PDDs.92 To be successful these agencies would require sufficient staff and 
should not operate in isolation from DNAs and other decision makers.93 Indeed, only if 
close cooperation is established among all actors involved in the implementation of 
climate policies can the process for foreign investors be streamlined and the effectiveness 
of the support measures be enhanced.  
 
To assist these agencies in achieving their tasks, international assistance will be crucial 
both to finance their programmes and to build up capacity. Such as the UNFCCC 
Secretariat which provides information seminars for DNAs, regular trainings should be 
organized for the staff of these agencies. Moreover, a database containing key 
information should be established and made available to the wider public. Finally, an 
                                                 
87 Studies carried out by the UNFCCC also revealed shortcomings in the current TNAs, which should be 
addressed by the financial means foreseen by the Poznan technology program. See Global Environmental 
Facility (2009).   
88Awareness-raising can take the form of information dissemination coupled to programmes of visits to 
existing demonstrations of technologies, demonstration programmes or support for exhibitions of new 
technologies. See ENTTRANS (2007: 45). 
89 See for more details on market mapping ENTTRANS (2007: 98). 
90 International assistance and cooperation will be crucial in the establishment of these plans as many 
developing countries lack the required expertise and capacity to design new climate policies. Recognizing 
these needs the GEF has recently increased the financial aid foreseen for the establishment of TAPs. See 
Global Environmental Facility (2009). 
91 These tasks should not be carried by the DNAs themselves to avoid conflicts of interests. See 
ENTTRANS (2007: 36). 
92 ENTTRANS (2007: 15, 36).  
93 ENTTRANS (2007: 15). 
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international body could be designated to act as a facilitator and be responsible for setting 
up an Internet portal allowing interaction between the various stakeholders.  
 
C. Structural reforms of the CDM   
 
The CDM’s focus on cheap short-term abatements has principally favoured end-of-pipe 
technologies at the expense of renewable technologies and energy efficiency strategies. 
Although this bias may to a certain extent be corrected by the enhancement of general 
investment conditions and support measures for this type of projects, investment flows 
may not be channeled towards these technologies in the absence of a more fundamental 
reform of the CDM. In the following section we therefore formulate some proposals 
ranging from the establishment of technology lists to to the introduction of a fast-track 
CDM and a discounting factor for undesirable abatement strategies. 
     
A straightforward possibility for bringing the CDM into line with the technology needs 
and priorities of developing countries would be to set up an international list of eligible 
and banned technologies, which would have to be revised from time to time to reflect 
changing circumstances.94 While such an option would allow the promotion of the 
technologies deemed the most useful for tackling climate change while excluding those 
that are less desirable, a consensus on which technologies to accept or to ban would 
probably be difficult to obtain. There have been many attempts in the past to compile lists 
of supported or forbidden technologies, but these have in general been dismissed or were 
so overloaded as to become essentially meaningless, while any effort to ban certain 
technologies has proven challenging.95   
 
To avoid such a deadlock, each host country could also set up its own list of eligible or 
banned technologies based on the TNAs conducted in their countries. A priori such a 
differentiated approach would best fit the needs and priorities of each country. There is, 
however, a strong probability that most countries will never consider seriously limiting 
the number of eligible technologies for fear of losing projects to other countries which 
offer cheaper abatement possibilities. This option, therefore, has little potential to reverse 
the actual investment trends. 
 
Investment flows can also be directed to key technologies if certain developed countries, 
or all of them, decide to accept only projects that meet certain technological requirements 
or if they establish quotas. Developed countries could, for example, require that a certain 
percentage of the portfolio of CERs come from projects using a specific type of 
technology. The probability of these options being adopted is again quite low as 
stakeholders exert strong pressure on their governments to allow recourse to cheap 
offsets.96   
                                                 
94 So far nuclear energy and carbon capture are excluded from the CDM. Some Parties have however 
expressed the wish to include them after 2012. See UNFCCC, Ad-hoc working group (2009). 
95 Staley et al. (2008: 18).  
96 See Schneider (2008: 30). 
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Another option to speed up the adoption of key technologies would be to establish a list 
of technologies that would be deemed additional and would benefit from expedited 
registration.97 Hence projects employing these technologies would not have to 
demonstrate explicitly that they are additional. By simply cancelling the additionality test 
for certain projects, the risk that the CDM would generate more meaningless credits is 
however significant.  
 
As an alternative to lists of eligible or banned technologies, one could also introduce a 
framework allowing the introduction of a discounting factor for credits generated by less 
needed technologies. This would allow more credits to be allocated to projects promoting 
key technologies while granting fewer to others, the amount of emission reductions being 
equal. Such an option could be implemented either on the supply side or the demand side 
of the CDM.98 It would help to address one of the principal concerns concerning the 
CDM: the creation of huge incentives to invest in projects for the abatement of non-CO2 
“super-pollutants” with a high global warming potential (GWP) at the expense of 
investments in desperately needed low-carbon energies. The abundance of these cheap 
non-CO2 credits does indeed create a perverse incentive not to invest in CO2 reducing 
projects, allowing countries to meet their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol by 
investing in a few lucrative projects, “quenching their thirst for further investments”.99  
 
Discounting would, by contrast, force investors to inject more funds into renewable 
energy projects, leading in turn to a much wider array of transferred technologies. 
Moreover, by limiting the number of emissions credits issued while maintaining the same 
level of emission reductions, discounting also addresses the concerns regarding the 
insufficient environmental integrity of the CDM.100 Finally, unlike an outright-ban of 
certain technologies reducing the so-called “super-pollutants”, discounting would still 
allow their elimination while ensuring that promoters and host countries would not 
collect huge windfall profits.101  
 
When setting the discounting factor, Schatz in his analysis of the shortcomings of the 
CDM proposed to fix the discount rate of a CDM project based principally on the 
marginal abatement costs (MAC) for each pollutant and the various abatement 
processes.102 Moreover, numerous other factors should be taken into account, such as the 
                                                 
97 See UNFCCC, Ad-hoc working group (2009: 12). 
98 On the supply side, only a certain percentage of the calculated emission reductions are issued as CERs. 
On the demand side, only a certain percentage of the CERs can be used for compliance. See Schneider 
(2008: 37)  
99 Schatz (2008: 722). 
100 Schatz points out that a discounted CDM would also prevent some of the current abuses. For instance, 
industrialists in host countries would be less inclined to produce super-pollutants, because they would no 
longer receive so many credits. See Schatz (2008: 729). 
101 Wara suggests that the costs of eliminating the so-called super-pollutants could be drastically reduced by 
setting up a special fund rather than using the CDM. See Schatz (2008: 735). 
102 The reason for basing the discount rate on the MAC is that the CDM fails to equalize the market price of 
an emissions reduction with its actual cost and thus assists in creating a scenario where industrialized 
nations often pay between 10 and 100 times more than the actual cost of these reductions. See Schatz 
(2008: 704). 
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project type and size, the country which hosts the project, and the transaction costs.103 A 
possibly less contentious option would be to establish a uniform discount rate for each 
type of technology. Whereas this option would probably be less efficient, its relative 
simplicity would ensure a greater comprehensibility for investors. On the other hand it 
would still allow the economic attractiveness of certain technologies to be reduced and 
conversely the promotion of others. As recommended by Schatz, a panel of reputable 
economists could be mandated to fix the discount rates so as to allow investments to be 
primarily channelled towards the most needed technologies.104   
 
IV. Sectoral carbon market crediting mechanisms 
 
With the exception of the framework allowing the introduction of a discounting factor, 
the previously discussed reform proposals do not address the problems related to the 
environmental integrity of the CDM.105 They may even exacerbate them if more 
renewable energy projects of questionable additionality enter the pipeline. Also, they are 
insufficient to incentivize the large-scale policy reforms necessary for the long-term 
uptake of key technologies. Finally, the project-related focus, which is inadequate to 
ensure a constant technological learning process, has not been fundamentally modified by 
the recently introduced category of “programmatic CDMs”.106 
 
Conscious of these shortcomings, the European Union has suggested that the CDM is 
phased out for advanced developing countries and highly competitive economic sectors 
in favour of sectoral carbon market crediting mechanisms.107 This proposal, which is 
aimed at broadening the current project-by-project focus of the CDM to encompass all of 
the sources of emissions within entire sectors, may well address certain of the 
deficiencies of the current CDM. The rationale behind this proposal is that major 
developing countries should be more deeply involved in fighting climate change and that 
a sectoral approach allows major emitting sectors to be dealt with cost-effectively. 
Moreover, if stricter standards are introduced in key polluting sectors, concerns about 
carbon leakage108 can be reduced.   
 
In theory, there are many possibilities for designing a sectoral carbon market mechanism. 
The EU distinguishes between two main categories: a sectoral crediting mechanism, 
                                                 
103 See for a thorough discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of a uniform discount rate and a flat 
discount rate Schatz (2008: 730ff). 
104 Schatz (2008: 737). 
105 See for reform proposals to enhance the environmental integrity the CDM de Sépibus (2009). 
106 The concept of “programmatic CDM” relates to project activities which can be registered as a single 
project under a programme of activities (PoAs). It was first formulated at the end of 2005 by the COP/MOP 
to allow the promotion of widely dispersed multi-actor energy efficiency activities by the CDM. The EB 
published the final forms for the submission of PoAs in August 2007. See World Bank, Carbon Finance 
Unit (2007: 8).    
107 European Commission (2009: 11). 
108 The term carbon leakage refers to a situation where there is an increase in CO2 emissions in one country 
as a result of a reduction in emissions by another country with a strict climate policy. 
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where emissions below a baseline in a particular sector generate ex post emission credits 
and sectoral trading, where allowances are allocated on an ex ante basis.109  
 
Sectoral crediting would be based on an agreed threshold for sectoral emissions or a “no-
lose target”, set below the business-as-usual (BAU) emission trends. For all the emission 
reductions achieved beyond the threshold, the developing country would receive 
emission credits that it could sell. It would however not be obliged to buy credits if 
emissions are above the threshold. 
 
The sectoral trading approach implies that a sectoral cap is defined that is below BAU 
emission trends. The developing country would have to take action to keep them below 
the cap. The difference with sectoral crediting is that tradable units are created ex-ante, 
and allocated to the developing country to a level equivalent to its target. If the target is 
not met, the developing country has to buy back units to ensure that the target is reached.  
 
Recently another approach has raised the interest of some countries: a sectoral crediting 
mechanism based on technology objectives.110 There is little information on how such a 
mechanism should be designed and how the technology would be defined.111 
Theoretically the latter can encompass broad categories of technologies and/or energy 
sources or narrow categories such as specific types of processes (i.e. waste heat recovery, 
or carbon capture and storage) or types of hardware (i.e. hybrid vehicles or efficient light-
bulbs).112 The formulation of the technological objective may take various forms. It can 
for example specify that a share of a sector’s output has to be produced by a certain 
process or that a certain percentage of cars must be hybrid. In this case the agreed 
technological goal forms the baseline.   
 
A technology-based approach offers both potential advantages and disadvantages. On the 
one hand, a technology diffusion goal is more visible and easier to monitor.113 A 
mechanism that supports the introduction of innovative technologies may also be more 
acceptable for countries like China which have declared technological innovation as a 
high national priority.114 On the other hand the setting of technological goals creates 
uncertainty as to their impact on GHG mitigation. Indeed, unless the latter is measurable, 
reportable and verifiable it is not clear how such objectives can provide access to the 
carbon market. 115 
Like the CDM, all sectoral carbon market crediting mechanisms may accelerate 
technology transfer and diffusion through the carbon signal they provide. Their concrete 
effects, however, will very much depend on the sector they are applied to and on the 
details of their implementation.116 Under these schemes domestic policymakers have a 
                                                 
109 Baron et al.  (2009: 45). 
110 CCAP et al. (2008). 
111 Baron et al.  (2009: 36). 
112 Baron et al.  (2009: 37). 
113 Baron et al.  (2009: 37). 
114 Baron et al.  (2009: 38). 
115 Baron et al.  (2009: 46). 
116 See CCAP (2009: 9). 
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wide range of policy options at their disposal to create incentives for investments in 
advanced technologies, ranging from subsidies for R&D, new financing tools, such as 
special purpose vehicles reducing barriers to finance, to cap-and-trade programmes.117  
While cap-and-trade programmes theoretically have a strong potential to accelerate the 
diffusion of mitigation technologies, their contribution towards fostering innovation is 
more contentious.118 Moreover, as the example of the EU emission trading system (EU 
ETS) highlights, if the caps are weak and allowances are “grandfathered”119 the system 
may well have perverse effects encouraging highly polluting entities through the 
distribution of massive windfall profits.120 Accordingly, a domestic policy that 
incentivizes renewable electricity through the grant of feed-in tariffs, if properly set, may 
well outperform a cap-and-trade programme in terms of technology innovation and 
deployment.121  
 
Another aspect that matters when choosing a sectoral crediting mechanism is the timing 
of the credits. According to Baron et al. who examined the various forms of sectoral 
mechanisms, an ex ante allocation that permits the devolvement of allowances to the 
entities in the sector offers a clear advantage over ex post credits. It broadens the signal 
of the carbon market to entities that have so far been insulated from it and enables 
mitigation investments to be directly rewarded through the sale of credits, without having 
to wait for a sector-wide assessment of emissions performance.122  
 
With sectoral crediting, the carbon market incentive to the individual investor is likely to 
be less clear, as an entity’s good performance may be offset by the lack of progress of 
other entities in the sector and eventually lead to the non-issuance of international carbon 
credits.123 On the other hand, the adoption of “no-lose” targets offers the advantage that 
more ambitious baselines may be set. As they carry no penalty for non-compliance, 
developing countries may engage in a discussion of more significant reduction goals.124  
 
Compared to the CDM, sectoral carbon market crediting mechanisms offer certain clear 
advantages. Through their focus on sectors they not only encourage projects but 
incentivize policy reform and more deeply involve developing countries. Second, they 
lower transaction costs as the additionality no longer has to be demonstrated for every 
single project. Third, if ambitious baselines are set, the mechanisms will go beyond pure 
offsetting. Fourth, competitiveness concerns due to strict carbon regulation in developed 
countries may be reduced if key sectors in major developing countries are subject to 
similar constraints.   
 
                                                 
117 CCAP (2009: 11). 
118 See for a critique of the incentives set by cap-and-trade programmes for renewables Driesen (2006).   
119 The term is used here in the sense that allowances are granted for free based on historical emission 
trends. 
120 See de Sépibus (2007). 
121 See de Sépibus (2008). 
122 Baron et al. (2009: 32). 
123 Solving this problem entails the country finding ways to compensate over-achievements and to sanction 
bad performance. See Baron et al. (2009: 7). 
124 Baron et al. (2009: 42).  
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Though these characteristics seem to favour substitution of the CDM with sectoral carbon 
crediting mechanisms, the latter may not always live up to expectations. Poor choices of 
boundaries may limit their potential benefits.125 In the absence of ambitious baselines, the 
international carbon market will be flooded with cheap credits that do not correspond to 
any significant mitigation effort by developing countries. Finally, the elaboration of 
baselines will require data on current practice as well as expertise on the available 
mitigation potential and costs, which is not readily available.126  
 
Sectoral carbon market crediting mechanisms may also fall short of achieving certain 
positive side-effects of the CDM. For instance, the CDM market has attracted many 
different players offering panoply of services in the form of project sourcing, 
development and methodology writing or offering risk management and carbon-fund 
management services.127 Through their active engagement in the international carbon 
market they have improved access to capital, making private investors aware of new 
investment opportunities128 and recipients of available domestic and international 
technologies.129  Moreover, different public actors such as development organizations, 
host countries and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have helped to 
raise awareness about carbon revenues among potential technology recipients, 
intermediaries and technology providers. Last but not least, the CDM has directly 
contributed to the commercial viability of numerous projects through the carbon revenue.  
 
While the credits generated by sectoral carbon credit mechanisms will continue to attract 
foreign investors in search of cheap abatement opportunities, the link between technology 
providers, consultants and technology recipients is likely to be less immediate. For 
instance, in the case of a sectoral credit mechanism based on no-lose targets, it is the host 
country that sells the credits and not the technology recipients. While this does not 
impede technology transfer it may not attract as many international private project 
developers involved in financing, building and operating an entire project on their own.130 
Accordingly, the potential of technology transfer may be reduced. Also, sectoral carbon 
crediting mechanisms do not provide incentives to non-covered sectors. If the CDM is 
abolished and not substituted by other financial mechanisms, attractive opportunities for 
cheap abatements in non-covered sectors may be overlooked. Finally, if sectoral carbon 
crediting mechanisms do not include sufficient incentives to industry, sectoral approaches 
may be less effective than the CDM in leveraging private finance. Given the importance 
of the private sector as a source of technological innovation and industrial know-how, 
this could be prejudicial to technology transfer. 
                                                 
125 CCAP (2009:9). 
126 See for a discussion of the main design elements of sectoral agreements CCAP (2009: 9). 
127 Schneider et al. (2008: 2933). 
128 See Schneider et al. (2008: 2934). 
129 As such, the CDM has contributed to addressing the four principal barriers to technology transfer, 
which, according to Schneider et al., are the lack of commercial viability, the lack of information about the 
investment opportunity, a lack of access to capital and an inadequate institutional framework. See 
Schneider et al. (2008: 2931).  
130 See for a discussion on the various types of financial involvement of investors and their influence on 
technology transfer and diffusion Schneider et al. (2008: 2934). 
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V. Conclusions 
 
Around 9 billion euro will have been put into CDM projects involving technology 
transfer by 2012.131 This makes the CDM the largest technology transfer mechanism 
under the UNFCCC. The idea of maintaining or even scaling up the mechanism under the 
new global climate agreement to accelerate technology transfer in line with the goal of 
the Bali Action Plan is hence tempting. The highly concentrated distribution of projects 
in a few countries such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico as well as the propensity of 
the CDM to promote technology transfer predominantly in two areas, that is end-of-pipe 
technologies and wind, however, cautions against a simple perpetuation of the CDM. 
Also, the dubious additionality of many projects, the perverse incentives prevailing in the 
verification process and the scant oversight argue for a significant structural overhaul or 
even for a progressive phasing out of the mechanism.  
 
If, notwithstanding, the CDM were to be maintained, reforms should be undertaken to 
ensure that it channels investments more effectively towards the technologies most 
needed for a low carbon future. This goal may be attained through the improvement of 
investment conditions for key climate technologies by host countries and changes in the 
incentive structure of CDM projects. While they may contribute to making critical 
climate technologies more attractive for investors, they only partly address the main 
shortcomings of the CDM: its incapacity to foster policy reforms and the dubious 
additionality of many CDM projects.  
 
Such a challenge may well be met more efficiently by a sectoral carbon crediting 
mechanism that involves more deeply developing countries and allows the adoption of a 
wide variety of instruments. If a transition to a “sectoral CDM” is envisaged, one lesson 
should be remembered from the experience with the CDM: it is the environmental 
ambition of the target and the environmental integrity of the system that will eventually 
determine the level of technological progress. If baselines are set too close to business-as-
usual scenarios and oversight is scant, international carbon prices fail to incentivize the 
necessary investments in critical climate technologies.132  
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